Haiti Democracy Project

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Inter-American Dialogue

Latin America Adviser

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Featured Q&A: Who’s to Blame for the Political Crisis in Haiti? ............ 1

The most recent of many attempts by the Organization of American States to negotiate a resolution of Haiti's political crisis has once again failed to produce any results. Who is most to blame for the political crisis—Aristide or the opposition? What should be the next steps for the OAS? Should the U.S. take a more active stance in Haiti?

Board Commentary: Beatrice Rangel: “Without an institutional framework
that facilitates interest aggregation and conflict resolution, Haiti cannot build,
let alone sustain, a sound democracy. Given the weakness of civic associa-tions
and the absence of a rule of law and a democratic culture, elected lead-ers
soon fall to the temptation of exerting power in an unchecked manner. President
Aristide bears a strong responsibility in the current crisis, as he is perhaps the single
leader with a strong popular appeal and support from the masses. He should use that
power more extensively in the difficult task of institution building.”

Guest Commentary: Jim Morrell: “Aristide goes into these meetings with two conflicting objectives. On the one hand he would like to restore foreign aid. Then he could pay salaries and stabilize the administration; more than 65 percent of the government’s budget comes from foreign aid. On the other—and for him this is more important—he wants to retain his monopoly in the legislature. He made his choice clear when he pushed through the flagrant fraud of June 2000 over the protests of the election commissioner and the OAS electoral mission. He has no incentive now for early elections.

“On balance, then, although he misses the aid and recognition, he has fallen back on the familiar petty flows such as drugs and telephone revenues. He believes he can hold out against a distracted Bush Administration. Verbal support of the war against terrorism, permission for the U.S. Coast Guard to search Haitian waters—these tokens should be enough to eventually bring the Administration around. None of the top people is hurting, as is clear from the sumptuous mansions bestowed on former president Préval and Prime Minister Cherestal.

“As for the opposition, a recent review of the year 2000 senatorial tally sheets reveals that the non-Fanmi Lavalas (FL) candidates actually outpolled the FL in four of the eight departments that voted, albeit the less populous ones. The opposition has no choice but to insist that it was denied substantial representation in the Parliament by fraud. With fair elections, Haiti would now have a parliament that could challenge the rampant corruption. It could challenge the parliamentary immunity of FL senator Danny Toussaint in the Jean Dominique murder investigation. As for the OAS, its marginal role from 1991 to 1994 proved that without the U.N. Security Council there is no purchase on Haitian leaders. The OAS cannot succeed alone. The Bush Administration should indeed play a more active role; it cannot succeed in Haiti without doing many of the hard things the Clinton Administration did in 1993 and 1994. And once doing them it cannot precipitously leave as Clinton did under Republican pressure; it must pursue a resolute program of nation-building with the United Nations, finding among the Haitians (mostly the opposition) the personnel capable of building a modern state.”

Jim Morrell is research director at the Center for International Policy